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Seeking to Promote Security Over Privacy
and Achieving Neither
Jon M. Garon*
The year 2015 proved to be a difficult year for the ideals of a networked
world brought together through computers and technology. The year was
characterized by a series of terrorist attacks across the globe involving some
cyber component (i.e., cyber-attacks). In 2014 policymakers focused on indi-
vidual privacy and governmental accountability, but the attacks of 2015 have
shifted their focus to global terrorism and a search for effective security.
Edward Snowden, the self-appointed whistleblower of 2013, was nearly
forgotten as security again took center stage. Cyber-attacks by China and
North Korea, terrorist attacks by ISIS,' domestic threats from homegrown
terrorists, and corporate attacks designed to destroy online companies com-
bined to make a new chapter in the world of cyber law. The year culminated
with the enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.2 This review highlights
a few of the key drivers that shaped the legislation and may help in anticipat-
ing the trajectory of regulatory policy in the years to come.
I. TERRORISM IN CYBERSPACE
Looking back on 2015, a predominant cultural theme was the "war on
terror" defined by the increase in Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS
or ISIL) attacks.3 These attacks have diminished the importance of the reve-
lations related to the unauthorized disclosure by Edward Snowden in 2013 of
potentially illegal and excessive government surveillance programs. 4
* Dean and Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Col-
lege of Law; J.D. Columbia University School of Law 1988. An earlier version
of this article was prepared as part of the 2016 Winter Working Meeting of the
American Bar Association, Business Law Section Cyberspace Law Committee
meeting held at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law,
January 30-31, 2016. Available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=2707756.
1. ISIS is the acronym for the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Evan Kohlmann, Everything you need to know about ISIS, MSNBC (Nov. 20,
2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/what-you-need-know-about-isis.
2. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Tairod Nathan Webster Pugh, 150 F. Supp. 3d 218,
221 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ("According to the Government, ISL is a foreign terrorist
organization that has existed, in one form or another, since approximately
2004.").
4. See Patrick M. Rahill, Top Secret-The Defense of National Security
Whistleblowers: Introducing A Multi-Factor Balancing Test, 63 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 237, 238 (2014) ("In the summer of 2013, the United States was hit with
what some have called one of the most significant national security leaks in
U.S. political history. Beginning in May 2013, Edward Snowden began leaking
documents that detailed a massive surveillance program orchestrated by the
National Security Agency.").
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In late 2015, ISIS coordinated an attack in Paris, France,5 and motivated
a domestic terrorist in San Bernardino, California.6 The effect of these at-
tacks has been to refocus public and private officials on efforts to reduce the
threat of terrorism.7 ISIS uses the Internet for a great deal of its communica-
tions, propaganda, and international coordination efforts.8 While some of the
hyperbole surrounding this issue focuses on anti-Muslim sentiment, others
focus on increasing public surveillance, 9 particularly the use of surveillance
techniques involving social media.o
At least one of the killers involved in the San Bernardino attack "talked
openly on social media about her views on violent jihad."11 Undoubtedly,
this will result in new demands for police and national security efforts to
increase surveillance on social media, and to link these tools to law enforce-
ment-at least for publicly accessible information. The attacker's use of so-
cial media will also likely increase efforts to encourage the public to report
such comments.
In the United Kingdom, for example, a new National Cyber Centre is
being planned.12 Government officials expect that most of its focus will be on
state-sponsored attacks but efforts will also target loosely organized groups
of individuals, like ISIS, who use the Internet and social media to attack
critical infrastructure.13
5. Adam Nossiter & Rick Gladstone, Paris Attacks Kill More than 100, Police
Say; Border Controls Tightened, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2015, at Al.
6. Michael S. Schmidt & Richard P6rez-Pefia, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino
Attack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2015, at Al.
7. Id.
8. See Larry Greenemeier, Anonymous's Cyber War with ISIS Could Compromise
Terrorism Intelligence, SCIENTIFIc AM. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.scientific
american.com/article/anonymous-s-cyber-war-with-isis-could-compromise-ter
rorism-intelligence/.
9. David Downey, San Bernadino Shootong: People Already Adapting to In-
creased Surveillance, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Dec. 26, 2015), http://
www.pe.com/articles/san-790330-cameras-bernardino.html.
10. Justin Jouvenal, The new way police are surveilling you: Calculating your




I. Matt Apuzzo et al., U.S. Visa Process Missed San Bernardino Wife's Zealotry
on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2015, at Al.
12. See Oliver Wright, ISIS plotting cyber warfare to kill people in UK, claims
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At a minimum, this means an increase in efforts to follow information
placed online through public sites. "The International Association of Chiefs
of Police reports that 95% of police agencies use social media (mostly
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) in their work. Last year, social media sites
helped crack a case for 79% of these agencies."14 In an MTV interview, Ser-
geant Adrian Acevedo of New Jersey's South Orange Police Department ex-
plained that the police "had a very big problem with flash mobs [which were]
designed to come and do crime. We quickly realized that these groups of
people, which sometimes could be in excess of 300 people, could mobilize
using social media within an hour's time."15 He noted that obtaining private
information requires a subpoena or warrant but that anything shared with
friends might be made available to the police by those friends.16
Sergeant Acevedo was also asked about the practice of "catfishing."17
"A catfish is someone who pretends to be someone they're not using
Facebook or other social media to create false identities, particularly to pur-
sue deceptive online romances."18 Sergeant Acevedo acknowledges that it is
occasionally done by law enforcement but suggests that it is too much of an
investment for normal policing procedures.19 Still, it does occur, and in Janu-
ary 2015, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) even agreed to settle a
catfishing lawsuit brought by Sondra Arquiett after the Justice Department
used her photographs and those of her son and niece in a false account for
investigative purposes. 20 The DEA settled the matter by paying $134,000 but
the agency did not admit wrongdoing.21
If intelligence surveillance is extended to discover and preempt terrorist
activity from groups like ISIS, it is also likely that many online sites use
catfishing techniques to introduce potential terrorists to security officials.
Governmental sites could present themselves as sympathetic to extremist po-
sitions to identify potential terrorists and learn how social media is being
used to recruit new participants.
14. Deepa Lakshim, We Asked a Cop How Police Really Use Social Media to Solve





18. URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=catfish
(last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
19. Lakshim, supra note 14.
20. Carl Williott, Woman Gets a Six-Figure Payday After The DEA Stole Her Iden-
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Perhaps the most tangible effect of this terrorist activity is the momen-
tum it provided to enact the Cybersecurity Act of 2015,22 a variation of the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) that had earlier stalled in
Congress.23 The omnibus $1.1 trillion spending law24 also includes hundreds
of millions of dollars to increase cybersecurity for the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies.25
As described by the House of Representatives, the Cybersecurity Act is
merely "a voluntary cybersecurity information sharing process that will en-
courage public and private sector entities to share cyber threat information,
without legal barriers and the threat of unfounded litigation-while protect-
ing private information."26 The Cybersecurity Act identifies Homeland Se-
curity as the primary resource for information sharing and creates a system to
encourage real-time threat information reporting.27
[T]he Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Home-
land Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General,
in consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal entities,
shall jointly develop and issue procedures to facilitate and pro-
mote-
(1) the timely sharing of classified cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures in the possession of the Federal Govern-
22. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113.
23. Everett Rosenfeld, The controversial 'surveillance' act Obama just signed,
CNBC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-
surveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html ("Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden . . . im-
plied that the information sharing provisions are worse than in previous incar-
nations . . . . The latest version of CISA is the worst one yet-it contains
substantially fewer oversight and reporting provisions than the Senate version
did.").
24. Id.
25. Pub. Law No. 114-113 (The FDA is to receive at least $28,000,000 for cyber-
security requirements; the IRS is to receive at least $290,000,000 "to improve
the identification and prevention of refund fraud and identity theft, and to en-
hance cybersecurity to safeguard taxpayer data." The Department of Homeland
Security is to receive at least $100,000,000 "to safeguard and enhance sys-
tems." And "the Environmental Protection Agency, $27,000,000 . .. to be used
solely to meet Federal requirements for cybersecurity implementation."). Id.
26. Id. (quoting HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RULES, https://rules.house.gov/sites/republi
cans.rules.house.gov/files/I 14/PDF/I 14-SAHR2029ca-MP.pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2016) ("The Cyber Security Act of 2015 (Division N) ... includes
provisions to improve federal network and information system security, pro-
vide assessments on the federal cybersecurity workforce, and provide reporting
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ment with representatives of relevant Federal entities and
non-Federal entities that have appropriate security
clearances;
(2) the timely sharing with relevant Federal entities and non-
Federal entities of cyber threat indicators, defensive mea-
sures, and information relating to cybersecurity threats or au-
thorized uses under this title, in the possession of the Federal
Government that may be declassified and shared at an un-
classified level . . . .28
The public sector is not mandated by the Cybersecurity Act to reveal
threats, but instead granted immunity from tort liability and antitrust actions
related to the disclosures.29 The government's adoption of the Cybersecurity
Act incentivizes reporting of "cyber threat indicators" and "defensive mea-
sures" the organization is taking to protect against cyber threats.30 In provid-
ing protection from liability, the law now offers explicit authorization for
28. Id. at Div. N, § 103.
29. Id. at Div. N, § 104(b)(4).
30. Id. at Div. N, §§ 102(6)-(7).
(6) CYBER THREAT INDICATOR.-The term "cyber threat indicator"
means information that is necessary to describe or identify-
(A) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of com-
munications that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gath-
ering technical information related to a cybersecurity threat or
security vulnerability;
(B) a method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a se-
curity vulnerability;
(C) a security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that appears
to indicate the existence of a security vulnerability;
(D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an informa-
tion system or information that is stored on, processed by, or tran-
siting an information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a
security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability;
(E) malicious cyber command and control;
(F) the actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a
description of the information exfiltrated as a result of a particular
cybersecurity threat;
(G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such
attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or
(H) any combination thereof.
(7) DEFENSIVE MEASURE.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
term "defensive measure" means an action, device, procedure,
signature, technique, or other measure applied to an information
system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transit-
ing an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a
known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.
2016] 355
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employing defensive measures against attacks without fear of legal liability.31
The law provides little more than a fig leaf for privacy protection,32 so only
the development of final implementing regulations will determine whether
there are meaningful safeguards from the potential abuse of the data sharing
provisions to intrude on individual privacy.33
The ability to use the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to promote the sharing
of information about malicious attacks and the protections the law affords to
private actors will have increasing reach over time as companies begin to
view the ability to share as a duty to take reasonable precautions. Over time,
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 is likely to set a new corporate standard for
threat disclosure and a new paradigm for public-private threat
coordination.34
(B) EXCLUSION.-The term "defensive measure" does not include
a measure that destroys, renders unusable, provides unauthorized
access to, or substantially harms an information system or infor-
mation stored on, processed by, or transiting such information
system not owned by-
(i) the private entity operating the measure; or
(ii) another entity or Federal entity that is authorized to provide
consent and has provided consent to that private entity for
operation of such measure.
31. Id. at Div. N, § 104(b)(1).
32. See Pub. L. No. 114-113 at Div. N, § 105(b)(3).
[C]onsistent with the need to protect information systems from cyber-
security threats and mitigate cybersecurity threats-
(A) limit the effect on privacy and civil liberties of activities by the
Federal Government under this title;
(B) limit the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat
indicators containing personal information of specific individuals
or information that identifies specific individuals, including by es-
tablishing-
(i) a process for the timely destruction of such information that is
known not to be directly related to uses authorized under this
title; and
(ii) specific limitations on the length of any period in which a
cyber threat indicator may be retained;
(C) include requirements to safeguard cyber threat indicators contain-
ing personal information of specific individuals or information that
identifies specific individuals from unauthorized access or acquisi-
tion, including appropriate sanctions for activities by officers, em-
ployees, or agents of the Federal Government in contravention of
such guidelines . ...
33. See id. at Div. N, § 202.
34. Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Signed Into Law, SIDLEY AUSTIN (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.sidley.com/news/2015-12-21_privacy-update ("The Cybersecurity
Act emphasizes that participation in the information sharing framework is vol-
[Vol. XIX356
Promoting Security Over Privacy
Commercial enterprises and governmental agencies are not alone in
these efforts. Hacktivist organizations such as Anonymous have actively en-
gaged ISIS.35 They "can make legitimate communications and business diffi-
cult to carry out, or even interfere with the intelligence community's efforts
. . . . If Anonymous shuts down a terrorist Web site or online forum that
government agents have already infiltrated, this could hinder valuable
counterterrorism surveillance and data collection."36
The U.S. government, like many throughout the world, recognizes that
much of the recruiting, coordinating, and collaborating is taking place in
Cyberspace.37 President Barack Obama made this statement regarding these
efforts:
Terrorist groups like al Qaeda and ISIL deliberately target their
propaganda in the hopes of reaching and brainwashing young
Muslims, especially those who may be disillusioned or wrestling
with their identity. That's the truth. The high-quality videos, the
online magazines, the use of social media, terrorist Twitter ac-
counts-it's all designed to target today's young people online, in
cyberspace.38
President Obama called upon the public to get involved in identifying these
potential terrorists before attacks have occurred, even before these individu-
als are fully committed to acts of terrorism: "We have to recognize that our
best partners in all these efforts, the best people to help protect individuals
from falling victim to extremist ideologies are their own communities, their
own family members."3 9
Organizations such as Anonymous have taken up the challenge. In Feb-
ruary 2015, the self-proclaimed hacktivist collective released 9,200 ISIS
Twitter account handles to the public.40 Anonymous used the hashtag "#Ctrl-
Sec" to flag ISIS accounts and allow Twitter sufficient information to shut
these accounts down.41
untary and prohibits conditioning any government benefit on participating. Par-
ticipation may nevertheless become industry standard or be required through
contractual or other legal obligations.").
35. Greenemeier, supra note 8.
36. Id.
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"Social media is not the only online platform for terrorists .... There
have been countless blogs, sites, and social media profiles devoted to pro-
moting terrorist ideals, but Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine is the first to com-
bine propaganda with how-to killing guides."4 2 As a result, the ideals of an
open, information-based global village took a very dark turn in 2015 as the
central focus on online attention has been combatting terrorism and the
highly efficient use terrorists make of cyberspace to stage attacks.
A. Privacy in Cyberspace and Mobile: The Short-Lived Impact of
Edward Snowden
The tone of public discourse in privacy and anti-terrorist activity has
vacillated significantly from 2013 through much of 2016. In June 2013, Ed-
ward Snowden, a government contractor, revealed to the Guardian newspa-
per and other media sources that he had illicitly copied classified materials
and was making them available to the press to highlight what Snowden be-
lieved were illegal surveillance activities by the U.S. government. 43 Snowden
stole and released the information because he believed "the public needs to
decide whether these programs and policies are right or wrong."44
As the scope of the stolen cache of information was revealed, Snowden
elected to flee the United States, and currently resides in Russia under a tem-
porary visitor status.45 Reports vary widely on the scope of the information
released, but credible estimates suggest at least 58,000 documents were cop-
ied and disclosed, though vastly fewer were published by media sources.46
Three years later, officials have shed little light on the characterization
and impact of Snowden's disclosures. In September 2015, James Clapper, the
Director of National Intelligence, acknowledged that Snowden's leaks
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Michael Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/1 0/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html?
r=0; Scott Shane, Ex-Contractor is Charged in Leaks on N.S.A. Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/us/snowden-
espionage-act.html; Tim Bakken, The Prosecution of Newspapers, Reporters,
and Sources for Disclosing Classified Information: The Government's Soften-
ing of the First Amendment, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2013).
44. Mazzetti & Schmidt, supra note 43.
45. Kevin Drum, Edward Snowden Didn't Expose the NSA's Bulk Phone Collec-
tion Program. Leslie Cauley Did., MOTHER JONES (Jun. 4, 2015), http:/
www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2015/06/edward-snowden-didnt-expose-ns
as-bulk-phone-collection-program-leslie-cauley-did.
46. Mark Hosenball, UK asked N.Y. Times to destroy Snowden material, REUTERS
(Aug 30, 2013, 1:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-snow
den-nytimes-idUSBRE97TORC20130830.
358 [Vol. XIX
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"forced some needed transparency."47 Clapper quickly qualified his remarks,
explaining that Snowden "exposed so many other things that had nothing to
do with so-called domestic surveillance or civil liberties and privacy in this
country."48
Clapper described only one area of direct harm caused by the leaks.49
The day after his comments, Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald wrote a
story regarding an important program operating in Afghanistan, "the program
was shut down by the government of Afghanistan, which was the single most
important source of force protection and warning for our people in Afghani-
stan."50 Government officials, both publicly and privately, lament the signifi-
cant intelligence damage and the lives placed at risk by the Snowden
revelations, but few specific incidents will be described on the record.51 This
lack of information fuels belief among Snowden's supporters that officials
are overstating the harms.52
Snowden's disclosures included documentation suggesting that the
United States was spying on European Union officials by obtaining access to
their computer networks, audio surveillance equipment, email servers, and
internal documents.53 Another document revealed that as of April 5, 2013,
there were 117,675 foreign nationals targeted for ongoing surveillance.54
Most surprising for many, was the knowledge that the NSA had the
ability to receive live notifications about email and chat activities by these
targets.55 Since the data was coming from the technology company providing
the service, this meant that the NSA and the ISPs were coordinating to allow
real-time intelligence gathering.56 This revelation rocked the public trust in
the major service providers and may have proved to be one of the most sig-
47. Jamie Crawford, Top Intel Official: Edward Snowden Forced 'Needed Trans-




51. Jason Leopold, Official Reports on the Damages Causes by Edward Snowden's
Leaks Are Totally Redacted, VICE NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015), https://news.vice.
com/article/official-reports-on-the-damage-caused-by-edward-snowdens-leaks-
are-totally-redacted.
52. See Crawford, supra note 47.
53. See Dana Liebelson, 5 Intriguing New NSA Revelations From Edward
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nificant long-term impacts of the revelations.57 This collaboration was further
substantiated by the revelation that the FBI's data interception unit was oper-
ating from inside the premises of the private telecommunications
companies.58
The Snowden disclosures created significant angst between U.S. and EU
governments over the allegations of international spying among allies.59 The
European Parliament characterized Snowden as a hero for revealing the spy-
ing against Germany.60
The Snowden leaks that had the greatest legislative impact, however,
are those related to the bulk collection of telephone data authorized by § 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act.61 Ironically, the bulk data collection was speci-
fied in the statute and covered by news reports as early as 2006. USA Today
correspondent Leslie Cauley had already alerted the public that the NSA's
goal is "to create a database of every call ever made." She had already shown
that "[w]ith access to records of billions of domestic calls, the NSA has
gained a secret window into the communications habits of millions of Ameri-
cans."62 But the legislature seemed only to respond years later when
Snowden detailed the same information.
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and its counterpart, § 2703(d) of
the Stored Communications Act, both provide the government access to non-
57. Chris Paoli, One Year Post-Snowden: Shattered Trust Is Hard to Repair, RED-
MOND MAG. (Jul. 29, 2014), https://redmondmag.com/articles/2014/08/0 1/trust-
is-hard-to-repair.aspx.
58. See Liebelson, supra note 53 (quoting Bill Binney, a former senior NSA offi-
cial who had attempted to become a whistleblower under the federal statute).
59. Notwithstanding the revelations that the United States systematically spies on
its allies, the government continued to refuse any adjustment to the prison sen-
tence of Jonathan Pollard, the only U.S. citizen convicted of spying for a U.S.
ally. Pollard was convicted of spying for Israel in 1987. On Nov. 20, 2015, he
was released from prison, having served thirty years of his life sentence and
becoming eligible for "mandatory" parole. See Sonia Moghe, Convicted Israel
Spy Jonathan Pollard Free After 30 Years, CNN (Nov. 20, 2015, 7:47 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/1l1/20/us/jonathan-pollard-israel-spy-release/.
60. Jay Newton-Small, U.S. Allies Still Angry at Snowden's Revelations of U.S.
Spying, TIME (Oct. 04, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/10/04/u-s-allies-
still-angry-at-snowdens-revelations-of-u-s-spying/ ("The European Parliament
this week named Edward Snowden a finalist for its prestigious human rights
award, the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought .... Snowden . .. revealed
that the U.S. monitored Germany as closely as it does China or Russia, inter-
cepting some 500 million communications monthly.").
61. Shaun B. Spencer, Data Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 19 J. IN-
TERNET L. 13, 16 (2015) ("Since 2006, the government has relied on Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act to collect telephone metadata on telephone calls
made to or from telephone numbers in the United States.").
62. Drum, supra note 45.
[Vol. XIX360
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content records related to telephone activities.63 Section 215, however, was
applied in a vastly broader manner. Items subject to the warrants include
anything "relevant" to an investigation.64 The government expanded the defi-
nition of relevant in a way that made unrelated telephone metadata relevant
to the subject of investigations merely because the size of the database im-
proved the quality of the data.65 Most actions under § 215 are heard by The
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC or FISA
Court).66
63. In upholding the constitutionality of Section 215, a U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC or FISA Court) reviewed the difference between the
two provisions:
For non-content records production requests, such as the type sought here,
Section 2703(c) provides a variety of mechanisms, including acquisition
through a court order under Section 2703(d). Under this section, which is
comparable to Section 215, the government must offer to the court "spe-
cific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id. § 2703(d) (emphasis
added). Section 215, the comparable provision for foreign intelligence
purposes, requires neither "specific and articulable facts" nor does it re-
quire that the information be "material." Rather, it merely requires a state-
ment of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
records sought are relevant to the investigation.
In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted],
No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *4 (FISA Ct. . Aug. 29, 2013). Despite
the lower privacy protection afforded by Section 215, the decision found the
other provisions of the law sufficient to be consistent with Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979), which established a very low bar for public protection of
intrusion into non-call information. Id.
64. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 812 (2d Cir. 2015).
[T]he g6vernment takes the position that the metadata collected-a vast
amount of which does not contain directly "relevant" information, as the
government concedes-are nevertheless "relevant" because they may al-
low the NSA, at some unknown time in the future, utilizing its ability to
sift through the trove of irrelevant data it has collected up to that point, to
identify information that is relevant. We agree with appellants that such an
expansive concept of "relevance" is unprecedented and unwarranted.
65. Id.
66. See About the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/about-foreign-in-
telligence-surveillance-court, (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) ("The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court was established by Congress in 1978. The
Court entertains applications made by the United States Government for ap-
proval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and certain other forms of
investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes."). The FISA Court was
2016] 361
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Section 215 decisions by the FISA Court are made after ex parte hear-
ings, and both the proceedings and the notifications are generally not pub-
lished.67 Still, a number of federal district and appellate circuit courts differ
sharply on the constitutionality of § 215 under traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.68
Prior to the Snowden revelations, most debate over the constitutionality
of § 215 was held within courtrooms. Afterwards, however, questioning its
propriety became a mainstream topic. President Obama addressed the issue
and Snowden's role:
[T]he combination of increased digital information and powerful
supercomputers offers intelligence agencies the possibility of sift-
ing through massive amounts of bulk data to identify patterns or
pursue leads that may thwart impending threats. It's a powerful
tool. But the government collection and storage of such bulk data
also creates a potential for abuse . . . . America's capabilities are
unique, and the power of new technologies means that there are
fewer and fewer technical constraints on what we can do ....
And for these reasons, I indicated in a speech at the National De-
fense University last May that we needed a more robust public
discussion about the balance between security and liberty. Of
course, what I did not know at the time is that within weeks of my
speech an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would spark con-
troversies at home and abroad that have continued to this day.
Given the fact of an open investigation, I'm not going to dwell on
Mr. Snowden's actions or his motivations . . .. [T]he sensational
way in which these disclosures have come out has often shed
more heat than light, while revealing methods to our adversaries
that could impact our operations in ways that we might not fully
understand for years to come.69
established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1885c (2015).
67. See id. ("Pursuant to FISA, the Court entertains applications submitted by the
United States Government for approval of electronic surveillance, physical
search, and other investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes. Most
of the Court's work is conducted ex parte as required by statute, and due to the
need to protect classified national security information.").
68. See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979); Spencer, supra note 61, at 16-17.
69. Barack Obama, Speech on NSA Reforms at The Justice Department (Jan. 17,
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The effort to reform § 215 culminated in the passage of the USA FREE-
DOM Act.70 In terms of direct legislative change triggered by the Snowden
revelations, this modification is likely the only tangible result of his efforts.
Under the new law, bulk collection is no longer permitted.71 But the govern-
ment has the ability to utilize the data, which continues to be available from
the telephone companies.72
In practice, very few changes may result of the new law. "It addresses
... the domestic phone records collection. But it does nothing to affect ...
the NSA's collection of foreign Internet content from U.S. tech companies, a
program that sweeps up lots of American communications."73 The USA
FREEDOM Act addresses some of the problems surrounding the FISA Court
secrecy but only modestly.74 And it does nothing to change foreign intelli-
gence gathering or efforts by the NSA to thwart encryption and to discourage
corporations from providing effective encryption tools to the public.75
Snowden faces serious criminal charges and has already been indicted
on three charges brought by the United States.76 The first charge is that of
theft of government property.77 The other two charges are forms of espio-
nage, specifically unauthorized communication of national defense informa-
tion78 and willful communication of classified communications intelligence
information to an unauthorized person.79 Notably, neither of the espionage
charges require that the information be made available to an enemy state.80
As a result of the nature of the charges and the scope of the theft, which was
70. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Ef-
fective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat.
268; In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of
Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75 & Misc. 15-01 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015), http:/
/www.fisc.U.S.C.ourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2015-75%2OMisc%2015-01
%200pinion%C20and%200rderO.pdf.; Spencer, supra note 61, at 17.
71. Ken Dilanian, 6 Things to Know About the Newly Approved USA Freedom Act,






76. Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH.
POST (Jun. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dabl-11e2-a016-9
2547bf094ccstory.html.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2015).
78. Id. § 793(d).
79. Id. § 798(a)(3).
80. Id.; id. § 793(d).
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significantly broader than that necessary to alert the public regarding illegal
governmental activities, Snowden will likely find it difficult to mount a com-
pelling legal defense.81
Although the Snowden revelations made a great deal of difference to the
public perception of privacy in 2013, they seem quaint in light of the 2015
focus on terrorism and the efforts by the United States and foreign govern-
ments to use these tools in an effort to anticipate terrorist activities. For better
or worse, the focus on privacy protection has been largely dropped from the
current agenda.
B. Undermining International Commerce: The Other Impact of
Edward Snowden
Although the impact of Edward Snowden's revelations had little effect
beyond minor changes to § 215, his disclosures have had a much greater
resonance internationally.82 In part, this may be because the European Union
has long had greater individual protection from unauthorized disclosure of
private information for its citizens than that afforded to the citizens of the
United States. 83
Privacy protection is best characterized as having two separate compo-
nents: protection from the government's unauthorized intrusion into its citi-
zens and protection from corporate or private individuals' intruding into the
lives of others.84 One of the ironies of the Snowden revelations is that his
focus was on improper government behavior, but the effect of the disclosures
will more directly impact corporate policies and access for U.S. companies to
operate in European markets.85
The European Union has long had greater individual protection from
unauthorized disclosure of private information for its citizens than that af-
forded to the citizens of the United States.86 In 1995, the European Union
adopted a comprehensive data directive to protect the privacy and informa-
81. Crawford, supra note 47.
82. See Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The Pond Betwixt: Differences in the US-EU Data
Protection/Safe Harbor Negotiation, 19 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2015).
83. Id. at 15 ("Both privacy and data protection are today part of the fundamental
rights system of Europe, a component of the amalgamated constitution of the
European Union. Both are part of the legislative and regulatory state at the
national and federal levels. This remarkable ubiquity of privacy and data pro-
tection in European law has come into being substantially in just the last half
century.").
84. Larry Magid, Protecting Your Privacy From Corporations, The Government
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tion of the residents of all member states.87 Numerous additional directives
expanded and clarified the regime of data and privacy protection in Europe
while the U.S. legal system only added sectoral privacy for health records,
financial records, and various types of information.88
While these systems have dramatically diverged, they are both struc-
tured around the common concepts of notice and choice.89 Notice relates to
the transparency of data practices while choice provides consumers the abil-
ity to give or withhold consent to the collection or use of data.90 Notice and
choice became the common ground that enabled the European Union to ig-
nore these significantly different data practices.9' The agreement was formal-
ized through the adoption of the FTC Safe Harbor provisions and EU
Commission Directive (2000/520).92
In actuality, the agreement was likely illusory. The "notice" given to
consumers is often done so in turgid, hard-to-read, difficult-to-access end
user license agreements which remain subject to change at the whim of the
data collector.93 Because opt-out schemes make it cumbersome and difficult
to actually opt-out, consent is often artificial.94 Moreover, opt-out schemes
often condition the use of company services on data disclosures and data
resale, which turns disclosure into a consumer-cost rather than a necessary
87. DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON
THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PER-
SONAL DATA AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
31.
88. See generally Peltz-Steele, supra note 82, at 16-20; Joel R. Reidenberg et al.,
Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and Users' Un-
derstanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 44-49 (2015).
89. Reidenberg, supra note 88, at 43-44.
90. Id.; BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A
REPORT To CONGRESS 7 (1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf.
91. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2013 PRIVACY AND
DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014) ("The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework pro-
vides a way for businesses to transfer personal data from the EU to the U.S. in
a manner consistent with EU law. The U.S. Department of Commerce adminis-
ters the voluntary framework, and the FTC provides an enforcement backstop.
To participate, a company must self-certify annually to the Department of
Commerce that it complies with the seven privacy principles required to meet
the EU's adequacy standard: notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data in-
tegrity, access, and enforcement.").
92. See Commission Decision (EC) No. 520/2000 of 26 July 2000, pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2000 O.J.
(L 215) 1 [hereinafter Commission Decision (EC) No. 520/2000].
93. See Reidenberg, supra note 88, at 46-49.
94. See generally id. at 48-49.
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part of the customer transaction.95 Despite the privacy protections purport-
edly provided by the Safe Harbor provisions, multinational corporations
could still transfer information between the United States and the EU without
violating European data privacy directives.96
Shortly after Snowden made his disclosures about U.S. surveillance in
The Guardian,97 Austrian citizen Maximilian Scherms brought a complaint to
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner related to the transfer of data by
Facebook Ireland, Ltd. to Facebook, Inc. in the United States. 98 Although the
Irish Data Protection Commission did not address the case, it triggered a
review by the Court of Justice of the European Union.99 There, the EU Court
specifically addressed the intrusion by the NSA under the PRISM program
revealed by SnowdenJOO
Following his success in the Court of Justice, Max Schrems began ex-
tending his complaint against Facebook to more data protection agencies.1
He has filed actions in Ireland, Germany, and Belgium.102 Schrems is person-
ally focused on companies in the United States identified as facilitating NSA
95. See supra text accompanying note 88.
96. See Jaap Kronenberg, EU Court Blocks Transfer of Personal Data to the US
via 'Safe Harbor' Arrangement, LEGAL KNOWLEDGE PORTAL (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://legalknowledgeportal.com/2015/10/22/eu-court-blocks-transfer-of-per
sonal-data-to-the-us-via-safe-harbor-arrangement/.
97. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveil
lance.
98. Kronenberg, supra note 96.
99. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/listejsf?language=EN&jur=C,T,F&num=C-362/14&td=
ALL.
100. Id. (The case notes that "all companies involved in the PRISM programme [a
large-scale intelligence collection programme], and which grant access to U.S.
authorities to data stored and processed in the [United States], appear to be Safe
Harbour certified ..... The effect is that PRISM and the USA PATRIOT Act
create "a number of legal bases under U.S. law allow[ing] large-scale collec-
tion and processing of personal data" from EU residents. The data may be
"accessed and further processed by U.S. authorities beyond what is strictly nec-
essary and proportionate to the protection of national security as foreseen under
the exception provided in (Decision 2000/520).").
101. Glyn Moody, After Safe Harbor Ruling, Legal Moves to Stop Facebook from
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surveillance, such as Apple, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. 103 But the court
decision affects all U.S. companies relying on the Safe Harbor provisions and
the Safe Harbor decision of the EU Commission (2000/520).104
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), "U.S. and EU offi-
cials are currently discussing the development of an enhanced mechanism
that protects privacy and provides an alternative method for transatlantic data
transfers."105 The remainder of the FTC's advice focuses on robust data pri-
vacy protections by the companies certifying data transfers within the Euro-
pean Union.10 6 The advice simply ignores that it is the U.S. government's
access to the private data, not the actions of the data holders, that has trig-
gered the invalidation of the Safe Harbor provisions.
The result of this work is the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework,
which serves to replace the Safe Harbor. 107 The European Union has certified
that the changes to the data protection are sufficient to meet the requirements
of the European Court of Justice based on U.S. commitments to enhance
privacy protections.108 In particular, the United States included assurances
103. Id.
104. See COMMISSION DECISION (EC) No. 520/2000, supra note 92, at 1.
105. Federal Trade Commission Update on the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework,
Safe Harbor Related News & Events, EXPORT.GOv, https://build.export.gov/
main/safeharbor/eg-main_018244 (last updated Nov. 6, 2015).
106. Id.
107. See U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks Advisory, http://2016.ex-
port.gov/SAFEHARBOR/ ("On July 12, [2016] U.S. Secretary of Commerce
Penny Pritzker joined European Union Commissioner Vra Jourovdi to an-
nounce the approval of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework, which will
replace the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor. Secretary Pritzker announced that the De-
partment will start accepting certifications on August Ist [2016].").
108. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant
to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified
under document C(2016) 4176) (Text with EEA relevance), 2016 O.J. (L 207)
1, 3 at 1 13, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec-impl/2016/1250/oj [hereinafter
Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250] ("The Commission ... con-
cludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection for per-
sonal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield from the Union to self-
certified organisations in the United States."). See also The EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/inter
national-transfers/eu-us-privacy-shield/indexen.htm ("This new framework
protects the fundamental rights of anyone in the EU whose personal data is
transferred to the United States as well as bringing legal clarity for businesses
relying on transatlantic data transfers. The new arrangement includes: strong
data protection obligations on companies receiving personal data from the EU;
safeguards on U.S. government access to data; effective protection and redress
for individuals; [and] annual joint review to monitor the implementation.).
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that it would provide oversight of self-certifying organizations and enforce-
ment of the Privacy Shield provisions.109 The United States also promised the
government intrusion into privacy rights for "national security, law enforce-
ment or other public interest purposes . .. will be limited to what is strictly
necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question . . . ."110 Nonethe-
less, the new Privacy Shield Framework retains the self-certification that was
deeply criticized under the safe harbor provisions."'
Schrems suggests that companies could overcome the concerns of NSA
spying by adopting comprehensive encryption, a technique that would thwart
easy access by the government.11 2 Given the high level of anti-terrorist col-
laboration between the nations, it is understandable that a new form of coop-
eration emerged that adjusts both U.S. and EU expectations of privacy from
the government. The concessions made by the United States are rather trivial,
so the concessions by the EU were essentially a repudiation of the Schrems
decision.
II. DOES PRIVACY REGULATION EVEN MATTER? DATA
VULNERABILITY CONTINUES TO EXPAND
There has been a corollary with the types of cyber-attacks committed
based on 2015's growth of terrorist activities. Data breaches are an ongoing
problem for both the private and public sector. Symantec reported that in
2014, "more than 317 million new pieces of malware" were released.113 An-
other report noted that in 2014, "the total number of security incidents de-
tected by respondents grew to 42.8 million around the world, up 48 percent
from 2013."ll4
2014 was a notable year in cybersecurity for its security breaches, so
any review of 2015 must consider the context of the previous year's record-
setting quantity and severity of breaches.115 "Major enterprises like Target,
Home Depot, and Sony Entertainment experienced breaches that required the
companies to pay hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to cover costs of the
109. Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, supra note 108, 32 1 139.
110. Id. 32 ¶ 140.
111. See Moody, supra note 101; Commission Decision (EC) No. 520/2000, supra
note 92, at 1.
112. See Moody, supra note 101.
113. Virginia Harrison & Jose Pagliery, Nearly 1 Million New Malware Threats
Released Every Day, CNN MONEY (April 14, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/
2015/04/14/technology/security/cyber-attack-hacks-security/.
114. ISACA, STATE OF CYBERSECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 2015, AN ISACA AND
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attacks. JP Morgan Chase and other financial institutions were affected even
more severely."116
The Sony Entertainment attack, though occurring in late 2014, is the
most notable because it may have been a state-sponsored form of cyber-war-
fare, and it reflected a new level of anti-corporate "hacktivism." This attack
began after a spokesperson for the foreign ministry of North Korea declared
the Sony movie, "The Interview," an "act of terrorism" and promised "merci-
less" retaliation as a response to the release of the film. 117 Despite this warn-
ing in June, Sony elected to continue with the distribution of the film.118 In
November, as the movie release date approached, "skulls appeared on em-
ployees' screens with a message threatening to expose 'secrets' from data
obtained in a sophisticated hack."19
The attack, however, was far more than a mere denial of service attack.
A series of interconnected viruses and malware stole emails and documents,
published confidential materials including movie scripts, and erased com-
puter drives to cripple the company. 120 A previously unknown group, Guardi-
ans of Peace, claimed responsibility and threatened physical attacks against
any movie theaters that planned to show the film.121
The scale of the attack and the resulting financial harm, combined with
terrorist threats, make this a uniquely dangerous attack. Revelations made in
January 2015, however, add yet another dimension.122 The NSA acknowl-
edged that it has concrete information of North Korea's direct involvement
with the attack because of U.S. surveillance technology implanted on the
North Korean military's systems.1 23 The pattern of probing and intrusions
took nine months, which suggests that the cyber-efforts began shortly before
the North Korean foreign minister made the threatening comments against
Sony.124
116. Id.




120. Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don't Know So Far,
WIRED (Dec. 3, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-
what-we-know/.
121. See The Interview: A Guide to the Cyber Attack on Hollywood, supra note 117.
122. See David Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks
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The major North Korean attack on a U.S. corporation (albeit one with
strong Asian roots) was followed in 2015 by a direct attack on key U.S.
government resources. An ongoing series of attacks breached the records of
the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM).125 OPM is an
independent agency of the United States that recruits, screens, and vets po-
tential employees for U.S. government positions that require any form of
governmental clearance.126 In one of the two reported incidents, personnel
data of 4.2 million current and former Federal government employees had
been stolen. 127 In the other, "19.7 million individuals that applied for a back-
ground investigation, and 1.8 million non-applicants, primarily spouses or
co-habitants of applicants" had application information stolen.1 28
The stolen data included Social Security numbers, employment history,
residency and educational history, criminal and financial history, finger-
prints, information about health, and personal and business acquaintances.129
On a categorical basis, this includes (almost)1 30 the most sensitive personal
information stored in any record keeping system.
Like the attack on Sony, government officials believe the OPM attack
was directed at the United States by a foreign government.13 1 "U.S. investiga-
tors believe Chinese hackers are responsible for the massive security breach
at nearly every federal government agency, a law enforcement source and
another U.S. official told CNN on Thursday."32 This matters because, unlike
other attacks, the OPM attack was designed merely to collect information.
"The national security community is now working under the assumption that
the Chinese have hundreds of thousands of security clearance forms."33
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Director of
National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr., characterized the OPM breach as
one of "theft or espionage" rather than an "attack" that would presumably
125. Cybersecurity Incidents, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, CYBER-
SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER, https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecuri
ty-incidents/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
126. .See About OPM, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, https://www.opm.gov/
about-us/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
127. Cybersecurity Incidents, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See discussion of Ashley Madison hack, infra notes 139-147 and accompany-
ing text (suggesting that correspondence regarding planned infidelity is perhaps
more sensitive than even social security and fingerprint data).
131. Theodore Schleifer, How China Could Have Hacked the U.S. Government in
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require a military or cyber-military response.1 34 He chose this frame because
of the information about U.S. activities revealed by Snowden and others and
also to keep tensions between the United States and China from escalating as
a result of this successful intrusion into the heart of U.S. information
systems. 135
Nonetheless, by September 2015, the threat had resulted in real-world
consequences. CNN reported, "[e]mployees of the Central Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency as-
signed to China are at risk of being exposed . . . ."136 The Washington Post
further explained that the comprehensive scope of the OPM attack could en-
able China to cross-reference the employees in a government facility.137 Any-
one who did not have his or her name in the OPM database could be
presumed to have been hired by the CIA rather than through the State
Department.138
Both the scale of the attack and the lack of a meaningful response have
increased the U.S. government's vulnerability. In an age of increased cyber-
espionage and terrorism, the loss of control of cyber-security has created a
fundamental foreign policy crisis. In the year of cyber-terrorism, the inability
to respond may highlight the problems we face for the future.
Despite the governmental vulnerabilities highlighted by the OPM attack,
one private company attack has potentially proven even more embarrassing
and intrusive. In July 2015, a hacker group identifying itself as "the Impact
Team" attempted extortion when it threatened to expose up to ten gigabytes
of customer data if the Avid Life Media (ALM) site, Ashley Madison was
not removed from the Internet.139 Ashley Madison is among the most well-
known Internet adultery sites. It uses the trademarked slogan, "Life is short.
Have an affair."40
134. Ellen Nakashima & Adam Goldman, CIA Pulled Officers from Beijing After
Breach of Federal Personnel Records, WASH POST (Sept. 29, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-pulled-officers-from-bei
jing-after-breach-of-federal-personnel-records/20 15/09/29/1 f78943c-66d 1-tI
e5-9ef3-fdel82507eac-story.htnl.
135. Id.
136. Evan Perez, U.S. Pulls Spies From China After Hack, CNN MONEY (Sept. 30,
2015, 9:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/30/technology/china-opm-
hack-us-spies/.
137. See Nakashima & Goldman, supra note 134.
138. Id.
139. See Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED
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Avid Life Media refused to close down and the Impact Team posted a
notice attacking the company for both its morals and its business practices.141
"We have explained the fraud, deceit, and stupidity of ALM and their mem-
bers. Now everyone gets to see their data."142
The posting by the Impact Team also suggested that the attack was fo-
cused on corporate management, not merely the potential adulterers on the
site. "Keep in mind the site is a scam with thousands of fake female profiles
.... 90-95% of actual users are male."143
The resulting breach was quite severe. The data breach affected a re-
ported thirty million accounts, "including those of 10,000 American govern-
ment officials, a handful of celebrities, a few clergymen and, apparently, very
few real female profiles.144 Leaked emails also showed that the company may
have hacked into the computer networks of its competitors."l45
The breach did result in some serious damage to Ashley Madison and its
leadership. Approximately one month after the data breach, the company's
chief executive, Noel Biderman, stepped down from his leadership role in the
company. 146
Biederman was not alone in leaving his post following a data breach.
Amy Pascal left her position at Sony Pictures Entertainment as co-chairwo-
man following its February 2015 intrusion, and Target chairman and CEO,
Gregg Steinhafel, resigned from his position after both the dramatic retail
data breach and other missteps that badly tarnished the once-popular
retailer.147
One additional 2015 data breach is also important to note in the context
of long-term consequences of data theft and intrusion. The controversial
spyware company known primarily to cybersecurity insiders, Hacking Team,
was itself the subject of a major intrusion. The attack exposed over 400
gigabytes of its internal sensitive data on the Internet.14 8 "The breached trove
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148. Andy Greenberg, Hacking Team Breach Shows A Global Spying Firm Run
Amok, WIRED (July 6, 2015, 10:26 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hack
ing-team-breach-shows-global-spying-firm-run-amok/ ("One document pulled
from the breached files, for instance, appears to be a list of Hacking Team
customers . . . [which] include Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kazakh-
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pany's twitter feed was hacked, controlled by the intruders for nearly 12
hours, and used to distribute samples of the company's hacked files."l49
The data dump exposed "what appear to be new confirmations that
Hacking Team sold digital intrusion tools to authoritarian regimes. Those
revelations may be well timed to influence an ongoing U.S. policy debate
over how to control spying software . . . ."150 As with any intrusion of this
sort, the information both helps shed light on the activities of the affected
company and provides those hoping to gain from such illegal intrusions new
insights and tools on how best to proceed.
The latter aspect of this attack should create a new level of concern.
Security expert Lior Div notes that the disclosed information "is the
equivalent of offering free copies of 'nation-state hacking for dummies' to
anyone remotely interested in the topic. Now, novice and/or minimally tal-
ented hackers have the capacity to pull off extremely sophisticated hacking
operations, a shift that is sure to level the cyber crime playing field."15
While this illustration of hacktivism may help take a significant tool
away from some authoritarian regimes, it is more likely that it exposed a
toolkit to an even greater set of cyber-criminals and terrorists.
III. CONCLUSION
While the Internet may bring the world closer, in 2015 it may have
contributed to making the world a more dangerous and existentially more
threatening place. Instead of a year defined by increasing individual privacy
and holding governments accountable for their spying on their citizens, the
increased focus on global terror and significant state-sponsored cyber-attacks
placed the focus squarely on security.
The impact of Edward Snowden was lost amidst the physical attacks in
London and San Bernardino. China's alleged attack on the OPM and North
Korea's attacks on Sony highlighted the difficulty of defining the nature of
cyberwarfare and responding when it occurs. The applications of the Cyber-
security Act of 2015 will expand to change the relationship of corporate
America with the federal agencies regulating it.
The loss of the US/EU Safe Harbor Agreement further erodes the ease
with which lawful information can travel across the globe, but the attack on
Ashley Madison reminds us that unauthorized disclosures can occur at a mo-
ment's notice. In short, 2015 was a difficult year for cybersecurity, one that
stan, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and several United States
agencies including the DEA, FBI and Department of Defense.").
149. Id.
150. Id.
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undermined many of the hopes that a robust online community adds to our
global understanding. Hopefully, however, the challenges of the past year
will bring a renewed energy to solving the problems facing the global com-
munity and build a more transparent and resilient system for the coming
years.
